The State of Utah v. Frederick Joseph Germonto : Reply Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1990
The State of Utah v. Frederick Joseph Germonto :
Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jan Graham; Attorney General; Christine Soltis; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for Appellee.
Curtis C. Nesset; Nygaard, Coke and Vincent; Attorney for Appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. Germonto, No. 900375.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/3158
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
FREDERICK JOSEPH GERMONTO, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 900375 
Priority No. 2 
REPLY AND SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a judgment and conviction for criminal 
homicide, murder in the second degree, a first degree 
felony; for robbery, a second degree felony, and for 
forgery, a second degree felony, in the Third Judicial 
District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, Judge presiding. 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BRIEF 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
KFU 
50 
.A10 
DOCKET NO. 
C\0f)3n5 
CURTIS C. NESSET (#4238) 
Nygaard, Coke & Vincent 
333 North 300 West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84103 
Telephone: 328-2506 
Attorney for Appellant 
Jan Graham 
Attorney General 
CHRISTINE SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Attorneys for Appellee 
F I L E D 
MAR 1 0 1993 
CLERK SUPREME COURT 
UTAH 
IN I'HK SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appelleef 
vs, 
FREDERICK JOSEPH GERMONTO, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 900375 
Priority No. 2 
REPLY AND SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from ~ jadgment and conviction for criminal 
homicide# murder in the second degree, a first degree 
felony; for robbery, a second degree felony, and for 
forgery, a second degree felony, in the Third Judicial 
District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, Judge presiding. 
CURTIS C. NESSET (#4238) 
Nygaard, Coke & Vincent 
333 North 300 West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84103 
Telephone: 328-2506 
Attorney for Appellant 
Jan Graham 
Attorney General 
CHRISTINE SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Attorneys for Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, RULES 2 
ARGUMENT 2 
POINT I 2 
THE HOMICIDE VERDICT VIOLATED MR. GERMONTO'S 
RIGHT TO A UNANIMOUS JURY VERDICT. MR. GERMONTO'S 
COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT RAISING THE ISSUE 
POINT II 12 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN 
IT PERMITTED THE CHARGES TO BE JOINED 
BECAUSE THE CHARGES DID NOT ARISE OUT OF A 
SINGLE CRIMINAL EPISODE. 
POINT III 15 
THE DEFENSE OF HABITATION INSTRUCTION WAS 
COMPLETELY INAPPLICABLE TO THIS CASE AND 
DEPRIVED MR. GERMONTO OF A FAIR TRIAL. 
POINT IV 18 
THE ROBBERY CHARGE SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED 
BY THE TRIAL COURT BECAUSE THE PROSECUTION 
FAILED TO PRESENT ANY EVIDENCE THAT THE ROBBERY 
WAS ACCOMPLISHED BY MEANS OF FORCE OR FEAR. 
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE ROBBERY CONVICTION WAS 
NOT SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE. 
POINT V 21 
THE PROSECUTOR'S CONDUCT VIOLATED MR. GERMONTO'S 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND EITHER PLAIN ERROR WAS 
COMMITTED OR COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT 
CURTAILING THE PROSECUTOR'S CONDUCT. 
CONCLUSION 25 
X 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
State v. Breckenridge 3 
Gold Standard v. American Barrick Resources. 
801 P.2d 909 (Utah 1990) 22 
Hofmann v. Condor, 712 P.2d 216 (Utah 1985) 23 
In Re R. J. Z. . 736 P.2d 235 (Utah 1987) 16, 18 
In Re Winship. 397 U.S. 358 (1970) 10 
State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390 (Utah 1989) 9 
State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 440 (Utah 1983) 3 
State v. Brown, 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 4 (Utah 1992) 3-5 
State v. Jameson, 800 P.2d 798 (Utah 1990) 3 
State v. Lopez, 762 P.2d 545 (Ariz. 1988) 21 
State v. McCovev. 803 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1990) 9, 11 
State v. Moritzskv, 771 P.2d 688 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) . . 10, 17 
State v. Russell, 733 P.2d 162 (Utah 1987) 6-8, 10 
State v. Standiford, 759 P.2d 254 (Utah 1988) 6, 8-11 
State v. Tarafa, 720 P.2d 1368 (Utah 1986) 15 
State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990) 5 
State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1988) 10, 11 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) 5 
STATUTES AND RULES 
Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence 13-14 
Utah Code Ann. Title 76 Chapter 2 Part 4 (1990) 16 
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-401 (1990) 16 
Utah Code Ann. §76-1-401 (1990) 13, 21 
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-203 (1990) 6 
ii 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
McCormick on Evidence §91, at 217 
(E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984) 23 
iii 
IN' THE SUPREME U,,w 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
FREDERICK JOSEPH GERMONTO 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 900375 
Priority No. 2 
REP OMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
INTRODUCTION 
The jurisdictional statement, issues presented for 
review, statement of the case, and facts have all been previously 
presented. (LDA Br. at 1-6; Supp. Br. at 1-3) .x After the State 
filed its response brief, this Court granted appellant additional 
time to address in his reply brief an issue which had been 
previously raised in a different context. The Court has also 
granted the State time to respond on this issue in its new 
context. Therefore, appellant presents this brief in reply to 
some of the issues raised by the State in its response and to 
address the first issue concerning jury unanimity in the context 
of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
1Four prior briefs have been filed in this case. Salt Lake 
Legal Defenders filed an opening brief which will be referred to 
as LDA Br., defendant filed a pro se brief which will be referred 
to as Pro Se Br., alternative counsel, appointed after LDA's 
withdrawal, filed a supplemental opening brief which will be 
referred to as Supp. Br., and the State has filed a response to 
all of the briefs which will be referred to as State Br. 
1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, RULES 
Any constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules 
relevant to the disposition of this appeal are set forth in the 
text or addenda of this brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE HOMICIDE VERDICT VIOLATED MR. GERMONTO'S 
RIGHT TO A UNANIMOUS JURY VERDICT. MR. GERMONTO'S 
COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT RAISING THE ISSUE. 
In its opening brief, Salt Lake Legal Defender 
Association (LDA) raised an issue concerning the nonunanimous 
nature of the jury verdict in this case. The trial court 
instructed the jury on all four possible variants of second 
degree murder, i.e. a knowing and intentional homicide, or a 
homicide committed as a result of the actor's intent to cause 
serious bodily injury to another, or depraved indifference 
homicide, or a homicide committed during the commission of an 
enumerated felony. The trial court did not instruct the jury 
that it must be unanimous on which variant of second degree 
murder it found. While this issue has been settled with respect 
to the first three variants of second degree murder by prior case 
law from this Court, the issue presented in this case, whether 
all four variants of second degree murder can be presented to a 
jury without a concomitant unanimity instruction is an issue of 
first impression. 
Mr. Germonto's trial attorneys did not object to the lack of 
a unanimity instruction nor did they propose that a unanimity 
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instruction be given. When LDA raised the issue in its brief it 
did not specifically allege either plain error or ineffective 
assistance of counsel. Rather the LDA brief relied on an 
apparent exception to the plain error rule which had been 
enunciated by this Court in State v. Breckenridae, 688 P.2d 440, 
443 (Utah 1983) and State v. Jameson, 800 P.2d 798, 802-03 (Utah 
1990). In Jameson, 800 P.2d at 802-03, this Court stated it was 
"obliged to consider [an issue] based on a constitutional 
question and [where] defendant's liberty is at stake." This 
proposition originated in State v. Breckenridae, 688 P.2d 440, 
443 (Utah 1983) . Current counsel, alternate counsel appointed 
after LDA's withdrawal, did not withdraw either of the preceding 
briefs and allowed them to stand as written, believing that the 
issue raised by LDA concerning jury unanimity was based on 
sufficient reasonable grounds articulated in Breckenridae and 
Jameson. 
In its response brief, the State argues that according 
to a recent case issued by this Court, this Court is now 
prohibited from considering the jury unanimity claim because it 
was not properly preserved in the trial court and not properly 
raised on appeal. The case relied on by the State is State v. 
Brown, 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 4 (Utah 1992), in which this Court 
stated that the Breckenridae language "has resulted in some 
confusion regarding the waiver/procedural default rule. . . . We 
do not intend in Breckenridae to carve out an additional 
exception to our traditional plain error standard, and we now 
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expressly disavow any implications to that affect." 201 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 5. The State argues that Brown applies directly to 
the issue raised by LDA and because it was not raised in another 
context, the issue should not be considered by this Court. 
However, by its order this Court has allowed the sides to address 
the issue in other contexts. 
Furthermore, Mr. Germonto contends that Brown does not 
foreclose consideration of an issue raised in such a manner as 
was raised by the LDA brief. Rather, Brown, merely states that 
rather than considering such an issue under a constitutional 
standard, such issues would be reviewed "using the plain error 
standard." Brown, 201 Utah Adv. Rep. at 5. Mr. Germonto asserts 
that when this standard is applied, the trial court committed 
plain error. While the LDA brief did not use the words "plain 
error" or "manifest injustice," an examination of LDA's brief 
arguably shows that the plain error standard was met in this 
case. 
Additionally, Mr. Germonto now asserts that his trial 
counsel was ineffective for allowing the jury to be instructed on 
all four variants of second degree murder without a concomitant 
unanimity instruction. Under either a plain error standard or an 
ineffective assistance standard, Mr. Germonto was prejudiced by 
the failure of the trial court to require a unanimous jury 
verdict.2 To demonstrate a claim of ineffective assistance of 
2
"Plain error" is a recognized exception to the general rule 
that errors must ordinarily be preserved in the trial court. Utah 
R. Evid. 103(b). To substantiate a finding of plain error, the 
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counsel, the defendant must demonstrate deficient performance 
which resulted in prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 687 (1984); State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990). 
The Strickland court stated that deficient performance occurs 
when counsel has "made errors so serious that counsel was not 
functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the 
Sixth Amendment." 466 U.S. at 87. Prejudice requires a showing 
that counsel's errors were "so serious as to deprive the 
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." 
486 U.S. at 687. 
At the time of the trial in this case, the case law on jury 
unanimity was well established in this state. Several cases had 
addressed the issue of unanimity with respect to jury verdicts in 
second degree homicide cases. Counsel should have been aware of 
those cases and also should have known that none of the cases 
addressed the issue raised by this case; i.e. whether a jury 
could have been instructed on all four variants of second degree 
homicide without a specific unanimity instruction. Counsel's 
failure to raise the issue via either an objection to the 
instruction or by offering an additional instruction constituted 
deficient performance. 
appellate court must find from a review of the record that it 
should have been obvious to the trial court that it was committing 
error and that the error was harmful in that it affected the 
substantial rights of the defendant. Brown, 201 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
5. In this case the plain error standard and the ineffective 
assistance standard are quite similar. The LDA brief covers the 
inherent error and the resultant prejudice. Therefore, the analysis 
in this brief deals only with ineffective assistance of counsel but 
much of it also applies to the plain error standard of review. 
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Utah Code Ann. §76-5-203 (1990) is the second degree 
homicide statute that was in effect at the time of the trial in 
this case. That statute states: 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the 
second degree if the actor: 
(a) intentionally or knowingly causes the death 
of another; 
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to 
another he commits an act clearly dangerous to 
human life that causes the death of another; 
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a 
depraved indifference for human life, he engages 
in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to 
another and thereby causes the death of another; 
(d) while in the commission, attempted 
commission, or immediate flight from the commis-
sion or attempted commission of aggravated 
robbery, robbery, . . . burglary, . . . causes 
the death of another person other than a party as 
defined in §76-2-202. 
In State v. Standiford, 759 P.2d 254, 259 (Utah 1988), 
this Court held that the first three variants of second degree 
murder were logically equivalent. Previously, in State v. 
Russell. 733 P.2d 162 (Utah 1987), the Court held that a jury 
need not be unanimous in deciding which of the first three 
variants of second degree murder is applicable in any particular 
case because the variants are virtually equivalent. In a 
concurring opinion, Justice Stewart indicated his concern that 
the lead opinion might be applied to crimes other than second 
degree murder. Justice Stewart concluded that "because their 
mental states are so highly similar, from the point of view of 
mental functioning and culpability, I think the jury was, for 
essential constitutional purposes, unanimous on the mens rea 
element." 733 P.2d at 170. After an extensive analysis of the 
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Utah provisions and comparison with the Model Penal Code, Justice 
Stewart stated that he concurred with the lead opinion's result 
because: 
Despite these departures from the Model Penal 
Code, it is clear from Russell, 106 Utah 116, 145 
P.2d 1003, and the MPC Commentary that all mental 
states in §76-5-203 (1) (a)# (b), (c) are 
essentially forms of common law malice 
aforethought. Each is at least "an intention or 
design previously formed to do an act or admit to 
an act, knowing that the reasonable and natural 
consequences thereof would be likely to cause 
death or great bodily injury." Russell, 106 Utah 
at 126, 145 P.2d at 1007. 
Not only is each mental state in the Utah 
statute a form of common law malice aforethought 
but each one also amounts to a varied form of 
depraved indifference murder. Certainly, inten-
tionally causing death demonstrates depraved 
indifference for the value of the life taken. . . . 
Therefore, a juror who finds that a defendant who 
intentionally or knowingly committed a homicide 
must necessarily find depraved indifference 
because the defendant who intends to kill is 
aware that his conduct creates a grave risk of 
death. 
A person who intends to cause serious bodily 
injury while doing an act "clearly dangerous" to 
human life, also acts with a depraved indiffer-
ence to the value of human life. Serious bodily 
injury is defined as "bodily injury that creates 
and causes serious prominent disfigurement, pro-
tracted loss or impairment of the function of any 
bodily member or organ or creates a substantial 
risk of death." Section 76-1-601(9). A person 
whose "conscious objective or desire" is to cause 
that type of injury while committing an act 
clearly dangerous to human life, §76-2-103(1), 
also demonstrates depraved indifference. The 
objective depraved indifference judgment is made 
out when the nature of injuries the defendant 
intends to cause is "serious," as opposed to 
"slight." . . . 
It follows that regardless of which 
mental state individual jurors relied upon in 
reaching this verdict, all agree that the 
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defendant knowingly engaged in conduct that 
created a grave risk of death of the victim 
and that he acted under circumstances that 
evidenced a depraved indifference to human 
life. 
733 P.2d at 173-74. 
Justice Stewart's opinion in Russell formed the basis 
for the decision in Standiford and is reflected in the lengthy 
discussion of depraved indifference contained in Standiford. 
According to the Standiford analysis, the depraved indifference 
variation of second degree murder is necessarily included in 
variations (a) and (b) of second degree murder. 769 P.2d at 259. 
Even if variations (a) and (b) are absent, the depraved 
indifference variation may still be present. This is so because 
the three variations form a continuum of mental states. Depraved 
indifference is more than the recklessness required for 
manslaughter but less than the intentional killing defined in 
variation (a) of the second degree murder statute. Standiford, 
769 P.2d at 261-64. Depraved indifference is the least common 
denominator for the first three variants of second degree murder. 
However, any time either of the first two variations is present, 
the depraved indifference variation will also be present, because 
all three variations evidence at least depraved indifference. 
Therefore, the Russell Court was able to hold that a jury does 
not have to be unanimous in deciding which of the first three 
possible mental states is present in convicting of second degree 
murder because the three mental states are so closely related as 
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to be a variant of the same culpable mental state. 733 P.2d at 
167. 
However, the fourth variant of second degree murder, 
often referred to as the "felony murder rule," does not share the 
commonalty of mens rea with the first three variants. In fact, 
the Court has stated that the fourth variant of second degree 
murder requires no mens rea. State v. McCovev, 803 P.2d 1234, 
1239 (Utah 1990); State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 393 (Utah 1989). 
Rather, the Court has held that variant (d) makes an 
unintentional killing committed during the course of an 
enumerated felony a second degree murder. £d. In McCovey the 
Court stated the rationale for not requiring an intent to kill 
under the felony-murder rule: 
The traditional common law purpose of 
the felony murder doctrine has been to allow 
the State to obtain a second degree murder 
conviction without proving any form of mens 
rea, or mental state. The felony murder 
statute automatically enhances the degree of 
the offense and punishment without the 
necessity of considering a mens rea or mental 
state, i.e. whether the felon intended to 
commit murder. In essence, it is a strict 
liability offense that enhances an otherwise 
unintentional killing to second degree 
murder. 
A further purpose of the felony murder 
statute is to deter the use of force or 
weapons in the commission of a felony. If a 
felon knows that a homicide committed during 
the commission of a felony, whether 
accidental or unintentional, will be treated 
as a first degree felony in addition to the 
underlying felony being committed, he or she 
will be less apt to use deadly force or 
dangerous weapons. 
803 P.2d at 1238-39. See also Standiford, 769 P.2d at 259. 
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In State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 577-80, 585-88 (Utah 
1988), a majority of this Court held that the Utah Constitution 
required that the jury be unanimous as to every element of a 
crime and that the term "element" includes both conduct and the 
culpable mental state. See also Standiford, 769 P.2d at 250. 
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution requires the same. In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 
358 (1970) . 
In Russell and Standiford, the Court determined that because 
the first three variants of second degree homicide encompass 
virtually the same mental state, a jury can be unanimous even 
though individual jurors may decide that a different variant of 
the statute are involved. All jurors agree that a mental element 
is involved. However, when the fourth variant of second degree 
murder is added to the set of variants which the jury may 
consider, some of the jurors may find that no mental element is 
involved while others may find that the homicide was committed 
under some mental element. In effect, instructing on all four 
variants of second degree murder allows a jury to be nonunanimous 
with respect to the mental element involved in the crime. Some 
jurors will find a mental element while others need not find such 
an element to return a verdict of guilt. Such a variation 
clearly violates Tillman. 
In State v. Moritzskv, 771 P.2d 688 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), 
the court of appeals held that counsel's failure to request a 
proper instruction on defense of habitation was deficient 
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performance. The court speculated that counsel's failure "to 
check the 'pocket-part' of the Utah Code" resulted in the 
deficient performance. 771 P.2d at 692. The court could 
conceive of no tactical basis for counsel's omission. 
In this case all the cases previously cited had been issued 
by this Court prior to the trial in this case except McCovey.3 
Therefore, counsel and the trial court should have been aware of 
the case law and of the problems of a nonunanimous jury verdict 
i 
and of the potential for a nonunanimous jury verdict because of 
the jury instruction which included all four alternatives of 
second degree murder without requiring the jury to be unanimous 
on either the first three variants or the fourth variant. 
Nothing was to be gained by allowing the jury to be nonunanimous 
therefore, the decision could not have been a tactical decision 
of counsel. Rather, counsel's actions can only be viewed as 
deficient performance. 
The prejudice inherent in a nonunanimous jury verdict 
was discussed by Justice Stewart in his concurring opinion 
Tillman. Justice Stewart stated: 
The importance of preserving the principle 
of jury unanimity as to all "elements of an 
offense" can hardly be overstated. To dilute 
that principle by allowing jurors to disagree 
among themselves as to separate, alternative ele-
ments of the crime, even though they agree on the 
general conclusion that the crime . . . has been 
committed, is to lose the value of the 
synergistic affect of jurors acting as a group 
3The proposition for which this brief cites McCovey was well-
known from other cases at the time of trial. See e.g. , Standiford, 
769 P.2d at 259. 
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and reconstructing facts and applying the law. 
Nonunanimity permits a jury to refrain from com-
ing to grips with determining precisely what the 
defendant did and then deciding whethei: that met 
the legal standards for defining the legal ele-
ments of the crime. 
Nonunanimity as to alternative elements of a 
crime can also deprive the defendant of a defense 
to the charge. . . . 
. . . Finally, if the principal of jury una-
nimity is relaxed, all the vaunted projections of 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt will be threat-
ened. Requiring juror unanimity as to the crime 
itself only, rather than each element of the 
crime, would permit a jury to render inconsistent 
and potentially irrational verdicts because they 
may be based on conflicting and even inconsistent 
determinations of the facts. That is no small 
erosion of a fundamental principal of our crimi-
nal justice system. 
750 P.2d at 578. As related by Justice Stewart, the prejudice 
inherent in counsel's deficient performance in failing to require 
a unanimous verdict as to the variant of second degree homicide 
deprived Mr. Germonto of the fair trial guaranteed him by the 
Utah and U. S. Constitutions. 
Counsel's deficient performance prejudiced Mr. Germonto and 
this Court should reverse his conviction. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN 
IT PERMITTED THE CHARGES TO BE JOINED 
BECAUSE THE CHARGES DID NOT ARISE OUT OF A 
SINGLE CRIMINAL EPISODE, 
In its opening brief, LDA noted that over the objection 
of defense counsel, the trial court allowed the prosecution to 
join in a single information the original forgery charge and the 
subsequent homicide and robbery/burglary charges. (LDA Br. at 
12 
14-18) In response, the State argues that the joinder was proper 
because the charges were part of a single criminal episode and 
the evidence of the forgery was otherwise admissible under Rule 
404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, in that "it supported defendant's 
identification in the homicide case." (State Br. at 26-31) 
Neither of the State's arguments is a valid reason for the 
joinder. 
Conduct is part of a "single criminal episode" if the 
conduct "is closely related in time and is incident to an attempt 
or an accomplishment of a single criminal objective." Utah Code 
Ann. §76-1-401 (1990) . The statute requires both temporal 
proximity and commonality of purpose for two or more crimes to 
form a single criminal episode. 
In this case, the forgery was accomplished fairly close in 
time to the homicide and robbery. However, the forgery was not a 
part of a single criminal objective. The State characterizes the 
single criminal objective as the objective of the defendant "to 
obtain 'things of value' from the victim." (State Br. at 28) 
However, the State presents no evidence which indicates that the 
defendant assaulted Mr. Lisonbee in order to obtain his check 
book or to commit a forgery. Rather, the only evidence presented 
at trial indicated that the defendant's killing of Mr. Lisonbee 
was in response to the latter's production of a dangerous weapon. 
(Supp. Br. at 6-15) The theft of items from Mr. Lisonbee's home 
occurred only as an afterthought after the victim had been 
rendered unconscious and probably dead. (T. 4 at 146-50) No 
13 
evidence, not even any circumstantial evidence, indicated that 
Mr. Germonto went to Mr. Lisonbee's house with the object of 
taking "things of value" from him. The State's assertions to the 
contrary are simply pure conjecture. The only inference 
supported by the evidence is that the forgery was a separate and 
distinct crime from any previous crimes committed by the 
defendant. 
The State also argues that evidence of forgery would 
have been admissible at Mr. Germonto's homicide trial because Mr. 
Germonto's "possession of the forged check only minutes after Mr. 
Lisonbee's death supported defendant's identification as the 
murderer, as well as his motive and intent in committing the 
homicide." (State Br. at 29) However, the State overlooks the 
fact that identification was not an issue in this case. Mr. 
Germonto admitted that he hit Mr. Lisonbee. (T. 4 at 144-45) The 
primary issue with respect to the homicide was whether it was 
committed in self-defense. 
Additionally, the State argues that joinder was proper 
because the forgery provided proof of motive. However, proof of 
motive is not required to maintain a criminal conviction. 
Therefore, contrary to the State's assertion, the evidence would 
not have been admissible under Rule 4 04(b). 
The forgery was used to stigmatize the defendant and 
influence the jury's fair and dispassionate consideration of the 
evidence. "The effect of joinder was to permit the consideration 
of prejudicial evidence pertaining to charges on which the 
14 
evidence would have been inadmissible in a separate trial." 
State v. Tarafa, 720 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Utah 1986). As such, the 
trial court abused its discretion when it permitted the 
information to be joined. 
POINT III 
THE DEFENSE OF HABITATION INSTRUCTION WAS 
COMPLETELY INAPPLICABLE TO THIS CASE AND 
DEPRIVED MR. GERMONTO OF A FAIR TRIAL. 
In its opening brief, LDA asserted that the defense of 
habitation instruction was erroneously given by the trial court. 
The instruction was inapplicable in this case and was prejudicial 
because the prosecutor misused it in seeking to meet the State's 
burden of proof. The effect was to lessen the burden of proof 
required by the State. 
In response, the State claims that the evidence 
supported the trial court's giving of the defense habitation 
instruction and that the defendant could not object to the 
instruction on the ground that it diminished the prosecution's 
burden of proof. In support of its claim that the evidence 
supports the instruction, the State makes several erroneous 
assertions. For example, the State claims that the defendant 
"never feared fatal harm from Mr. Lisonbee." (State Br. at 33) 
However, the State ignores Mr. Germonto's testimony that he 
feared for his life when he saw Mr. Lisonbee with a knife in his 
hand. (T. 4 at 194) The State also claims that the evidence 
supports "a reasonable inference that while Mr. Lisonbee may have 
opened the door, defendant gained entry into the home by 
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assaulting Mr. Lisonbee." (State Br. 34) However, the State can 
point to no evidence which supports this "inference." For 
example, there is no evidence that Mr. Germonto entered the house 
carrying any type of implement that could have been used as a 
weapon, for example, a wrench. 
Lost in its own maze of twisted inferences, the State fails 
to address the real issue, i.e. that the defense of habitation 
instruction given by the trial court pertains only to a statutory 
defense. The statute which gave rise to the instruction is found 
in a part of the Utah Code which is entitled "Justification 
Excluding Criminal Responsibility." Utah Code Ann. Title 76 
Chapter 2 Part 4 (1990). The part concerns "conduct which is 
justified [as] a defense to prosecution . . . ." Utah Code Ann. 
§76-2-401 (1990). (Addendum A) The defense of habitation 
instruction was a non sequitur in this case. By giving the 
instruction, the trial court turned the entire concept of the 
statute on its head. 
Additionally, even if the instruction was somehow 
appropriate, certain prerequisites must be met before such an 
instruction may be given. In In re R.J.Z., 736 P.2d 235, 236-37 
(Utah 1987), this Court enumerated the requirements to be met 
before the defense of habitation statute may be invoked: 
In order to avail himself of the 
justification provided by Section 76-2-
405(1), the defendant must have had a 
reasonable belief that the force was 
necessary. We interpret the term 
"reasonable" to mean objectively reasonable. 
In order to be justified in using deadly 
force, certain other requirements must be 
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met. If the entry is a violent or 
surreptitious one, the defendant must have 
had a reasonable belief that the entry was 
made for the purpose of committing a violent 
act. Further, the defendant must reasonably 
believe that the force used was necessary to 
prevent the violence. The defendant would 
also be justified in using deadly force if he 
had a reasonable belief that the entry was 
for the purpose of committing a felony and 
that the force used was necessary to prevent 
the felony from being committed. 
In 1985, the legislature amended section 
76-2-4 05 to add the language now found in 
section 76-2-405(2). . . . After considering 
the language and the legislative history of 
this amendment, we are persuaded that the 
legislature intended that a legal presumption 
of reasonableness would arise whenever an 
entry is "unlawful" and "made or attempted by 
use of force, or in a violent and tumultuous 
manner, or surreptitiously or by stealth, or 
for the purpose of committing a felony." 
The trial judge refused to make a 
finding as to whether the entry in this case 
was unlawful and forcible. We hold that such 
a finding is essential to the proper 
application of section 76-2-405. The first 
step in deciding whether any defendant is 
justified under section 76-2-405 is to 
determine what burden of proof the defendant 
and the State are respectively required to 
carry. It is impossible to allocate the 
burden of proof without first determining 
whether the defendant is entitled to the 
statutory presumption. 
The instruction given in this case allowed the jury to 
"infer" that Mr. Lisonbee acted reasonably. (R. 267) this 
"presumption" of reasonableness is beneficial to the party 
receiving it inasmuch as it shifts the burden of proof to the 
other party. Moritzsky, 771 P.2d at 691. When given in its 
normal context, the effect is to shift the burden to the State. 
However, in this case the effect was to impermissably shift the 
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burden to Mr. Germonto. When combined with the prosecutor's 
argument (LDA Br. at 19-21), the instruction allowed the jury to 
presume that Mr. Germonto's self-defense claim was legally 
unavailable and that the burden of proof necessarily shifted to 
the defendant. 
Furthermore, no evidence supported a finding that Mr. 
Lisonbee had a reasonable belief that force was necessary. No 
evidence supported a finding that Mr. Germonto's entry into Mr. 
Lisonbee's house was other than invited. No evidence supported a 
finding that Mr. Lisonbee's use of force was necessary to prevent 
violence. No evidence supported a finding that Mr. Germonto's 
entry was for the purpose of committing a felony. Finally, no 
finding was made by the trial judge that the entry was unlawful 
and forcible as required by R.J.Z. In short, even if the giving 
of the instruction was appropriate, the necessary prerequisites 
required by R.J.Z. were not met. 
The trial court's use of the defense of habitation 
instruction was not justified by the statute, was not supported 
by the evidence, did not comport with R.J.Z., and impermissably 
shifted the burden of proof to the defendant. 
POINT IV 
THE ROBBERY CHARGE SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED 
BY THE TRIAL COURT BECAUSE THE PROSECUTION 
FAILED TO PRESENT ANY EVIDENCE THAT THE ROBBERY 
WAS ACCOMPLISHED BY MEANS OF FORCE OR FEAR. 
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE ROBBERY CONVICTION WAS 
NOT SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE. 
In his supplemental brief, Mr. Germonto asserted that 
the robbery charge was unsupported by the evidence and, as a 
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matter of law, should have been dismissed because the prosecution 
failed to establish all of the required elements that demonstrate 
that a robbery occurred. 
The State responds by claiming that the defendant has 
not marshaled the evidence to support his contention, that the 
evidence did support the robbery conviction and that "under the 
res gestae rule, it is inconsequential that the death of the 
victim preceded the [robbery]." (State Br. at 36-42) 
The State's contention that the evidence has not been 
marshaled is simply untrue. Pages 8 through 11 of the 
defendant's supplemental brief clearly details the evidence 
concerning the robbery. 
The "evidence" which the State claims supports the 
conviction does not include two crucial pieces of evidence. 
First, the State ignores Mr. Germonto's testimony that before any 
items were taken, Mr. Lisonbee was at least unconscious and 
probably dead. Also ignored is the medical examiner's testimony 
that Mr. Lisonbee could have lived for only a period of one to 
perhaps as much as fifteen minutes after the blows were 
inflicted. (T. 3 at 33) The State can point to no evidence 
I 
other than its own conjecture and speculation that Mr. Germonto 
formed an intent to take property from Mr. Lisonbee before Mr. 
Lisonbee died. Indeed, the evidence supports Mr. Germonto's 
version of events, i.e. that Mr. Lisonbee confronted Mr. Germonto 
with a knife and pushed Mr. Germonto while cutting his hand. Mr. 
Germonto, fearing for his life, began to hit Mr. Lisonbee with 
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the wrench that was in his hand. Regardless of whether Mr. 
Germonto intended to kill Mr. Lisonbee or acted in self-defense, 
it is clear that at the time Mr. Lisonbee was bludgeoned, no 
evidence supports the inference that Mr. Germonto intended to 
take anything from Mr. Lisonbee. Only after Mr. Lisonbee lay 
unconscious did Mr. Germonto form the intent to take some of Mr. 
Lisonbee's property in order to facilitate his escape from Salt 
Lake City. (T. 4 at 151) No evidence presented by the 
prosecution contradicts this theory of the case. Indeed, the 
prosecution argued this theory of the case to the jury in closing 
arguments when the prosecutor stated that Mr. Germonto should be 
found guilty of the robbery because "he robbed Mr. Lisonbee after 
he killed him." (T. 5 at 46) 
The question which the State avoids and which this Court 
must address is whether the robbery statute which requires an 
unlawful or intentional taking of personal property in the 
possession of another "from his person or immediate presence, 
against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear" can be 
accomplished when the victim is unconscious or dead and the 
defendant inflicted the wound which caused the victim's injuries 
without an intent to take the victim's personal property. The 
cases cited in the appellant's supplemental brief clearly 
demonstrate that if a murder is committed with no intent to 
commit a robbery, no robbery has occurred. "If a theft is 
conceived of, and executed after a murder, it is a theft but it 
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is not an armed robbery." State v. Lopez, 762 P.2d 545, 551 
(Ariz. 1988). 
Furthermore, as argued in the appellant's supplemental 
brief, if this Court finds, as other courts have, that Mr. 
Germonto's robbery conviction was not supported by sufficient 
evidence, because the taking was not executed by means of force 
or fear, then Mr. Germonto's murder conviction must also fail. 
(Supp. Br. at 15-16) If some jurors predicated their finding of 
guilt on the felony murder rule and the underlying felony is not 
supported by the evidence, then the homicide conviction also 
lacks evidentiary support. 
Under this set of circumstances, Mr. Germonto may have 
committed a murder and a theft, but not a robbery. However, 
theft is not one of the enumerated felonies in §76-5-203(d) which 
will support a conviction for murder in the second degree under 
the felony-murder rule. Therefore, as argued in Point I above, 
because some of the jurors could have found that the murder was 
committed under variant (d) of the second degree murder statute, 
the murder conviction must fail because of the prospect that the 
jury was not unanimous on all of the elements which constituted 
the offense of second degree murder. 
POINT V 
THE PROSECUTOR'S CONDUCT VIOLATED MR. GERMONTO'S 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND EITHER PLAIN ERROR WAS 
COMMITTED OR COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT 
CURTAILING THE PROSECUTOR'S CONDUCT. 
In both the LDA opening brief and appellant's supplemen-
tal brief, arguments were advanced that the prosecutor engaged in 
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prejudicial misconduct when he questioned Mr. Germonto concerning 
when the defendant disclosed the version of events which he 
related during his testimony. Additional error was committed 
when the prosecutor argued to the jury that Mr. Germonto should 
not be believed because he had not disclosed the version which 
was the subject of his testimony to his own attorney until 
shortly before trial. Because the prosecutor's questioning and 
argument were not objected to at trial, the issue was raised in 
the context of both plain error and ineffective assistance of 
counsel. (LDA Br. at 22-27; Supp. Br. at 16-25) 
The State responds to the argument by claiming that no 
attorney-client privilege existed which could haive been 
infringed by the prosecutor; that even if the content of the let-
ter were privileged, the defendant waived the privilege by 
answering the prosecutor's questions on cross-examination; that 
the prosecutor's comments did not invade the defendant's right to 
remain silent; and that the defendant was not prejudiced by the 
prosecutor's conduct. 
Communications subject to the attorney-client privilege 
are those which promote the best possible representation of the 
client and encourage candor between the attorney and the client. 
Gold Standard v. American Barrick Resources, 801 P.2d 909, 911 
(Utah 1990) . Furthermore, each case must be considered individu-
ally to determine whether the communication in question can prop-
erly be considered confidential under the privilege. Id. The 
threshold inquiry to determine whether a communication is 
22 
confidential is whether the communication was intended by the 
client to be confidential. Hofmann v. Condor, 712 P.2d 216, 217 
(Utah 19€5) (Zimmerman, J., dissenting) citing McCormick on 
Evidence §91, at 217 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984). 
In this case, Mr. Germonto's letter was initially delivered 
to the trial judge. However, the trial judge did not read the 
letter and immediately passed it to defense counsel. (M. 5 at 
10) Defense counsel stated that the letter "totally, and 
completely changes our defense." (R. 313 at 3-4). Mr. 
Germonto's answer to the prosecutor's question at trial indicates 
that the letter was indeed directed to his attorney and was only 
passed to the judge to facilitate delivery to the attorney. (T. 
4 at 226) Furthermore, the answer indicates Mr. Germonto's 
desire to communicate candidly with his attorney. Clearly, the 
letter was a candid communication from Mr. Germonto and was 
designed to promote the best possible representation of him by 
his attorneys. Therefore, the letter was clearly a confidential 
communication subject to the attorney-client privilege. 
The State claims that even if the communication was sub-
ject to the attorney-client privilege the confidentiality was 
waived when the following exchange occurred between the 
prosecutor and Mr. Germonto during trial: 
Q. When did you first tell anybody about this, 
"he-attacked-me-with-a-knife" part of the story? 
A. The first time that I told the truth about 
what has happened was right after my meditation 
that the Lord told me that, "the truth is the 
only way. The truth is the only thing that is 
going to save you from that. The truth is the 
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only thing that you can do now." And so, I wrote 
my attorney, which was directed to the judge, a 
letter explaining all of the things thatt I said 
here today. 
(T. 4 at 226) 
Rather than volunteer information which would waive the 
attorney-client privilege, Mr. Germonto's answer was a direct 
response to the prosecutor's prejudicial question which was 
gleaned only because the prosecutor possessed knowledge of the 
existence of the confidential letter. Indeed, if the prosecutor 
did not have knowledge of the confidential letter, he would have 
been unable to ask the question. The prosecutor did not know 
before the existence of the letter what Mr. Germonto7s defense 
would be to the charges, i.e. whether Mr. Germonto would admit to 
killing Mr. Lisonbee in self-defense or whether he would deny any 
participation in the crime. The prosecutor took advantage of his 
knowledge of the existence of the confidential letter to ask Mr. 
Germonto questions which impinged on Mr. Germonto's 
attorney-client privilege and his right to remain silent. A 
properly interposed objection by defense counsel or questioning 
of the prosecutor's motivation in asking the question by the 
trial court would have prevented the prosecutor from ascertaining 
any information from Mr. Germonto. 
Counsel's error in not objecting to the question clearly 
cannot be termed a tactical decision because nothing could have 
been gained by Mr. Germonto's answer which plainly affected his 
credibility. Rather, the failure to object was an oversight 
which was deficient performance. The State claims that Mr. 
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Germonto could not have been prejudiced by either the error by 
the trial court or the ineffectiveness of his trial counsel 
because as the State claims, Mr. Germonto's "credibility was not 
central to the case . . . ." (State Br. at 51) The State's 
argument incorrectly discounts the reality that Mr. Germonto's 
credibility was at issue. If the jury believed Mr. Germonto's 
version of the events, then it would have found that Mr. Germonto 
acted in self-defense and that he had not committed a murder. 
The prosecutor's questions and comments in closing argument 
infringed on Mr. Germonto's attorney-client privilege and his 
right to remain silent. The trial court's and defense counsel's 
inaction prejudiced Mr. Germonto's case. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above and in the preceding briefs 
filed on behalf of Appellant, Mr. Germonto's conviction should be 
reversed and remanded for a new trial or dismissal. 
Respectfully submitted this fu day of March, 1993. 
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
c 
CURTIS C. NESSET 
Attorney for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
PART 4 
JUSTIFICATION EXCLUDING CRIMINAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 
76-2-401. Justification as defense — When allowed. 
Conduct which is justified is a defense to prosecution for any offense based 
on the conduct. The defense of justification may be claimed: 
(1) When the actor's conduct is in defense of persons or property under 
the circumstances described in Sections 76-2-402 through 76-2-406 of this 
part; 
(2) When the actor's conduct is reasonable and in fulfillment of his 
duties as a governmental officer or employee; 
(3) When the actor's conduct is reasonable discipline of minors by par-
ents, guardians, teachers, or other persons in loco parentis; 
(4) When the actor's conduct is reasonable discipline of persons in cus-
tody under the laws of the state; 
(5) When the actor's conduct is justified for any other reason under the 
laws of this state. 
History: C. 1953, 76-2-401, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-401. 
76-2-405. Force in defense of habitation, 
(1) A person is justified in using force against another when and to the 
extent that he reasonably believes that the force is necessary to prevent or 
terminate the other's unlawful entry into or attack upon his habitation; how-
ever, he is justified in the use of force which is intended or likely to cause 
death or serious bodily injury only if: 
(a) the entry is made or attempted in a violent and tumultuous man-
ner, surreptitiously, or by stealth, and he reasonably believes that the 
entry is attempted or made for the purpose of assaulting or offering per-
sonal violence to any person, dwelling, or being in the habitation and he 
reasonably believes that the force is necessary to prevent the assault or 
offer of personal violence; or 
(b) he reasonably believes that the entry is made or attempted for the 
purpose of committing a felony in the habitation and that the force is 
necessary to prevent the commission of the felony. 
(2) The person using force or deadly force in defense of habitation is pre-
sumed for the purpose of both civil and criminal cases to have acted reason-
ably and had a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or serious bodily 
injury if the entry or attempted entry is unlawful and is made or attempted by 
use of force, or in a violent and tumultuous manner, or surreptitiously or by 
stealth, or for the purpose of committing a felony. 
History: C. 1953, 76-2-405, enacted by L. section (l)(a); substituted "in the habitation" 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-405; 1985, ch. 252, § 1. for "therein" in Subsection (l)(a); inserted "he 
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amend- reasonably believes" in Subsection (l)(a); sub-
roent designated the first paragraph as Subsec- stituted "in the habitation" for "therein" in 
tion (1); redesignated former Subsections (1) Subsection (l)(b); added Subsection (2); and 
and (2) as Subsections (l)(a) and (l)(b); in-
 m a d e m i n o r c h a n g e s i n phraseology, 
serted surreptitiously, or by stealth in Sub-
